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Showing posts with label Obama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Obama. Show all posts

Friday, December 16, 2016

The 5 Principles of Cyber Warfare

This week we got a partial glimpse into the types of action that the United States might consider to be acts of Cyber Warfare. I had written about this topic 2 weeks ago in regards to Voting Integrity in the face of Russian cyber attacks, but the story has escalated since then – culminating this week in direct accusations against the Russian government. The CIA and even President Obama have directly implicated Putin as being personally involved with the deliberate aim of swaying the 2016 election. In a year of big stories, this may have been the most far reaching in its implications. One of those implications, which has already been alluded to by many in Washington, is that this act may in fact represent a form of Cyber Warfare.

So, what exactly does Cyber Warfare mean and how does it differ – if at all – from Cyber Terrorism? That’s a tough question, one that I’ve not seen answered clearly before. Cyber Terrorism can come from nation states, such as China, North Korea, Iran and so forth, but one might expect that actions perpetrated by nation-states are less like terrorism per se and more like warfare. It is worthwhile at this point to step back into the not too distant past and bring up a similar question that also still applies here – what’s the difference between a “Cold” and a “Hot” war? The Cold War, as you might remember, involved a whole host activities from espionage to proxy wars. The Hot or real war between the super-powers never occurred and it didn’t happen primarily because of the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction through use of our nuclear arsenals. In that case, the distinction between the terms also involved both the nature of the participants as well as the types of activities involved which is similar to the current question.
None of this really helps though to clear up the confusion regarding what is or what isn’t Cyber Warfare. Here are a few reasons why:
  • Cyber Warfare can be both covert and overt – depending on the nature and intent of the attacks as well on the determination as to whether they should be publicized in any way.
  • Cyber Warfare could be conducted by both Nation States and Terrorist organizations. The key distinction here though would be that we wouldn’t necessarily classify acts committed by smaller unknown groups or even individuals as Cyber Warfare. In those instances, the term Cyber Terrorism might be more applicable. However, it is also clear that in Cyber Warfare, as in traditional warfare, non-nation state organizations can and have conducted offensive operations.
  • Cyber Warfare can be a standalone or blended activity (e.g. coordinated with other traditional war-fighting activities). It’s conceivable that an entire conflict could be fought solely within the Cyber Domain. Cyber “Domain” here refers to the notion that Cyber represents one of several potential war-fighting domains such as Land, Sea, Air and Space. The US military formally acknowledged Cyber as such a domain with its creation of US Cyber Command several years ago. Of course the reality of this statement is more complicated than it sounds as Cyber also infiltrates all other warfare domains through the technology implied by it – it is cross-cutting domain and even if an attack were completely limited to Cyber actions it is highly likely that physical capabilities (such war-fighting assets as ships, planes etc.) might be impacted.
  • Cyber Warfare can be directed at the Government or the Industrial Base or both. We can’t say for example, that all attacks against businesses must be considered Terrorism per se – the intent is what’s important. If the intent of an attack is to cripple the country that’s been targeted, then a Cyber attack like that is no different in principle from the types of bombing raids we conducted against Germany in WW2 in order to cripple its industrial base. Today though, the sectors that are perhaps more vulnerable might be Energy and Finance as opposed to Manufacturing. The results might be the same though if the goal is hobble an economy or otherwise disrupt a nation state.
Now, we are ready to consider what the distinctions between Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism really are. They would likely involve the following considerations:
  1. Cyber Warfare must necessarily consist of a sustained campaign of Cyber activities, designed to disrupt any mission critical functions of an enemy at a national level. This doesn’t mean the activities have to occur in many places to effect a national impact, it merely has to be designed to impact an opponent that way (and would also likely encompass more than one attack or incident).
  2. Cyber warfare must necessarily occur between substantial Cyber combatants. The nature of what constitutes a ‘substantial’ combatant lies in what resources they have to bring to bear in any given conflict. A well-established terrorist or rebel group may have the money and personnel to manage sustained attacks. However smaller groups with few resources may only be able to sustain limited operations or a single attack. While there is always the possibility that an individual or a small group might be able to do harm at the national level, it is unlikely that they could sustain this over months or years and it would be more akin to one-off terrorism than warfare in the context of sustained operations and likely outcomes.
  3. Cyber warfare, in general, involves more specific objectives in contrast to Terrorism which is often random in nature and may only be focused on making a statement rather than effecting some desired outcome.
By these definitions, I’d have to say that the Russian hacking of the DNC computers and related activities designed to impact the 2016 election falls under the category of Cyber Warfare rather than Terrorism. And this begs the question, why does all of this matter and why do we need more specific definitions? The bottom line is, that if we don’t have a clear idea of what represents acts of Cyber warfare (either covert or overt), it’s highly likely we won’t be able measure our response properly. Deciding how to respond is obviously a very big deal – as any such decisions could quickly escalate from the Cyber domain into all the others. Perhaps our government does have all of this worked out, and maybe it’s just too secret for any of us to know about. However, from our vantage point now it’s all bit fuzzy. When the President says “we will retaliate in a manner and time of our own choosing” we basically don’t have a clue to what that really means.
Rather than spend a lot of time speculating as to what our response might be, we can instead highlight some principles that may apply to any such situation. The following principles represent a potential framework that might be used to help deal with Cyber warfare as it continues to evolve.
  1. Proactive Awareness – In order to survive or win any Cyber conflict, the nation needs to know when in fact it is under attack. Some attacks are more obvious than others and as the recent election shows, our response can be slow or too late to avoid impacts. Proactive Cyber Awareness is not about hacking into everyone’s cell phones, but rather it is about being able to identify unusual behavior in key systems and sectors across the country (or wherever our interests may be). This means we need more selective and actionable intelligence then we seem to be getting now.
  2. Measured Response – This has been mentioned in the news, but as I noted it’s not been explained by anyone (at least publicly) yet. For this to actually work, someone needs to define the measured responses up front rather than assessing each event as if it were the first time it had been considered. The landscape is fairly complicated so this involves a lot of work and some automation. However, it shouldn’t fully automatic any more than our current traditional war-fighting capabilities are – the human in the loop must always be present.
  3. Defined Escalation Approach – This is a process and it ought to be built atop the measured responses defined previously, the idea being that whenever or wherever Cyber activities begin crossing over to other areas there needs to be another level of safeguards built in to avoid any type of cascading escalation that could lead to something like a nuclear conflict.
  4. Maintain a Consistent Policy - In theory, our management of Cyber war shouldn’t be unique in each potential scenario – there ought to be a consistent expectation as to what will happen if enemies launch attacks against the US. This is a key point in the recent debate over Russia as the situation has also become embroiled in US political differences, confusing the matter. While there will always need to be specific considerations given to certain situations, we should never give an indication to any opponent that Cyber attacks may be permitted without any response coming from the US. This would be an extremely dangerous precedent and helps to explain why the President and CIA made statements this week to the effect that election interference would not go unpunished. Better late than never and like all of warfare, if we're in the game we should build policy around what's necessary to win - as opposed to settling for mere survival. There may such as a thing as a Cyber Maginot Line...
  5. Continuous Innovation – This may be the most important point, given the stark reality that it is easier and more cost effective to mount a Cyber attack than it is to defend against one. Despite the billions spent each year in the US across government and the private sectors, Cyber Security breaches and attacks have only become more prevalent and severe. More focus needs to be given to pushing the envelope on innovation to help reduce the current advantages enjoyed by our Cyber opponents. Today, much if not the majority of innovation has come from the attackers and we’ve been playing catch-up. As in every other realm of warfare, the side with the greatest technological advantage tends to win.
It’s anyone’s guess as to whether the current Russian hacking crisis will boil over into something more, but one thing is certain, the age of Cyber Warfare has most definitely dawned.

Copyright 2016, Stephen Lahanas

Thursday, October 31, 2013

The Real Problem with Healthcare.gov

The biggest story in IT this year is without a doubt, the rollout issues surrounding Healthcare.gov - a.k.a Obamacare. The story is both bizarre and quite familiar at the same time and does represent perhaps the first time that national politics has been so laser-focused on an IT project. Many people who have been introduced into the world of IT through this might think that the saga of Healthcare.gov is unique or somehow unusual - well, it is isn't. By many accounts, more than half or more IT projects fail - this is consistent across government and industry (there have been spectacular failures in both arenas).

As the media circus has picked up steam over the past 2 weeks, we've been treated to a Congressional attempt to hire John McCaffee and Edward Snowden's offer to fix the problem because he knew what it was. We're just waiting on Miley Cyrus to weigh in...

that is, if you can sign on...
The figure associated with the project so far - (approx $170 million) is not in fact that large for a complex IT project. Just last year, the AF Logistics ERP project, ECSS was cancelled after $1.2 billion was spent - no one seemed to notice it (outside of interested circles). The director of Health & Human services has held herself personally accountable in multiple apologies so far for the various problems associated with the site; which seem to include the following:

  • An inability to handle the anticipated user traffic (multiple site crashes)
  • An inability to generate user logins
  • Errors which involve policy termination
  • password reset failures
  • Failure on the underlying data integration hub
  • Multiple page not found related errors
  • Various problems surrounding form processing
  • Data center crash
There have been any number of armchair quarterback giving simple fix suggestions to the problem - as with most similar situations such advice is generally less than useful. The most common one I've seen relates to the need for the government to use open source coding practices (which it was in fact doing with code up on github). So, let's be clear - for projects like this - there is not now and never will be silver bullet fixes - they are too complex. It's also important not make knee-jerk comparisons to commercial solutions either. I've seen a number a quotes trying to compare Healthcare.gov and Amazon.com; Amazon spent more than a decade perfecting their technologies and likely invested several billions of dollar in it. From news accounts, it seems as though coding for Healthcare.gov only began sometime early this year.  

So what happened? Well, I've only got clues from various articles but several key elements seem to stand out:
  1. Somehow, the team seemed to have made a decision regarding who should enroll and when didn't occur until very late in the game (when isn't exactly clear).
  2. That enrollment capability seems to be tied to Oracle Identity Management suite - which is a very complicated tool and requires a significant amount of engineering (custom code, performance considerations, etc.).
  3. For whatever reason, the development timeline got pushed to the right but the rollout deadlines didn't change. 
  4. There seems to be some lack of clarity as to who was the integrator (the prime vendor or government agency).
  5. The contract was issued in December of 2011, but requirements were delayed - and requirement changes were being made up through this September. (very common story actually)
  6. There were a great number of moving parts - more than 50 contractors. This may also imply an overly complex architecture.
  7. It appears that there was an excessive amount of code involved - which begs the question - why wasn't more of this handled with prepackaged (portal) software?
  8. The prime vendor didn't seem to have had experience architecting portal solutions with the type of volume that would clearly be associated with Healthcare.gov. 

John McCaffee is not the tech support we need to solve the Healthcare.gov mystery
Unfortunately, given the nature of the problems, it seems as though fixing Healthcare.gov while doable may take longer than is being promised. Sometimes, throwing extra money and attention towards a problem at this stage has the unwanted effect of making things even more complicated. Here are some suggestions though that may help alleviate the current crisis:

  1. Eliminate the need to register just to shop for plans.
  2. Refine project roles and responsibility immediately - choose / assign a lead integrator.
  3. Switch to incremental roll-outs for actual enrollment (e.g. shopping available nationwide by enrollment opens up state by state).
  4. Assign tiger teams per critical problem (e.g. one for identity management, one for the data hub, one for performance engineering etc.)
  5. Do not oversell the fix timelime; in other words don't promise something you can't deliver - extend the overall compliance timelines in order to give the project time to catch up. 

Copyright 2013, Stephen  Lahanas

#Semantech

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

The Architecture of Debate

Tonight marks the second presidential debate in election 2012. Many people are thinking about who will perform and who won't, but how many are talking about the architecture of this week's debate? Sounds a bit strange doesn't it; but believe it or not one can apply the principles of Architecture to just about everything and Debate is no exception. What this statement implies is that there is in fact an organized structure behind every debate (despite whatever performances are turned in by the candidates), and several structures if you really think about it:
  1. The structure of the debate event itself; the rules under which the participants agree to follow (or not as was the case in this year's first presidential debate).
  2. The structure of each participants core positions or arguments.
  3. The structure of the attacks by each participant on the others positions or arguments. 
What Keywords will you catch in tonight's debate?
As we stated in a previous post, Politics are based primarily around information and communication; so it stands to reason that a debate in some sense resembles an information architecture. The determination as to who wins a debate is a fairly subjective exercise; what can be measured perhaps is how "well-architected" their approach (and delivery is). So what does that mean? If we look back at the three main components of Debate Architecture listed above then we might provide some subjective measures based upon:
  • Whether the candidate / participant was able to work effectively within the rules; e.g. were they able to provide arguments and responses within the allotted time-frames or did they constantly run over time. Were they able to get their point across within their own sections or did they feel it necessary to interrupt the opponent/s during theirs?
  • Did the participants' arguments make sense; either in the context of their political ideology, their platform or the precise questions being posed during the debate (and hopefully across all of these contexts).
  • Were the participants able to respond or defuse their opponents' arguments or did the participants simply talk past those - perhaps repeating key phrases or slogans that address the topic generally but not the specific arguments made during that debate.
How did they do last week? It depends on how you measure it...
These are just some of the ways we attempt to assess the outcomes of debates. If we were to take it a step further, perhaps we could even diagram some of this out. For example, we might consider that each argument or political theme has multiple dimensions; for example a political one, an economic one and a personal one.
  • The Political Dimension – This represents how people view their government as well as political values & philosophies.
  • The Economic Dimension – This dimension represents how people view economic policy and philosophy.
  • The Personal Dimension – This dimensions captures the personal expectations of constituents as well as a general sense of what the “individual” represents within a society.
Not every argument or issue will span all three of dimensions but surprisingly most of them do. For example, one might think that a social issue ought to reside primarily in the personal dimension but what if part of the argument addresses government regulation of that social issue and another directly affects national or state budgets?



An Ontology can provide an organizing framework for all information associated with a domain
Arguments can be built using Dimensions at a high level, but what about at the the detail level? That's where having an organized approach to managing a large set of complex and inter-related knowledge comes in very handy. One of the best ways to do that is through use of Ontology (see the illustration above). Who knows whether either candidate will bring their A game tonight - but perhaps the real question is - do they have a game plan?


Copyright 2012, Semantech Inc. All rights Reserved